The United States has been intensely monitoring Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes, US diplomatic cables unveiled by whistle-blower website WikiLeaks have indicated.
Dozens of cables from US embassies around the world are seen inquiring into purchases by Pakistan's nuclear and missile complexes from the international market, the Dawn reports.
In a 2008 cable, the then US Deputy Chief of Mission to Turkey, Nancy McEldowney, detailed her discussions with Turkish authorities about the US' desire to see relevant action taken against a suspicious shipment to Pakistan.
According to the cable, US officials "urged the GOT (Government of Turkey) to contact the governments of Japan and Panama to request the shipment be diverted to another port and returned to the shipper".
While Turkish authorities "stressed that more lead time was necessary to allow the GOT to take action in such cases", McEldowney "underscored that, given the proliferation concerns related to this shipment and the fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is not under full-scope IAEA safeguards, the GOT should take all necessary action to prevent the shipment from arriving in Pakistan."
The intricate pursuit of suspect Pakistani shipments often involved discussions with Chinese authorities, the paper said.
For example, a secret December 2009 cable noted that when local authorities were notified of "Beijing-based Nav Technology's efforts to supply controlled gyroscopes to a firm in Pakistan", US officials received a satisfactory response "that as with all proliferation cases, China would 'actively cooperate' on this case".
In Taiwan, too, Pakistan's missile programme and related international trade came in for intense American scrutiny.
In a secret cable sent out from Taipei in the autumn of 2005, the then director of the American Institute of Taiwan, Douglas H Paal, sent a detailed report on Pakistan's trade with a local manufacturer, Xtra Industrial Corporation.
Paal wrote about how "Pakistani manufacturer 'Mechanical Engineering Workshop (MEW)' possibly purchased 14 sets of 'hydraulic cylinders' from Xtra Industrial Corporation in March 2005, from Taiwan-based Design Engineering Centre (DEC) transferred to Pakistan's National Development Complex (NDC) for research and development of short-mid range missiles."
As with other cases, Taiwanese authorities were recommended that they place Xtra under an inspection target list, even though the manufacturer did not violate Taiwan's strategic high tech commodity export control regulations.
On one occasion, French authorities rebuffed US requests to intercept a "shipment of telemetry equipment from the French firm In' Trad to Pakistan, with the possible end-user being New Technologies Islamabad, which is associated with Pakistan's ballistic missile programme."
In a secret cable from January 2005, a French non-proliferation official, David Bertolotti, was quoted as providing US officials with "comprehensive comments on the shipment and the reasons behind the Government of France's decision not to examine its contents and to allow it to continue onto Pakistan".
While the French officials emphasised that the "GOF wanted to be more helpful regarding the suspect corporation between In'Trad and Pakistani missile entities", they also pointed out that they needed "more precise information regarding the type of equipment being exported as well as clearer indications that the end users were associated with Pakistan's ballistic missile programme". ANI
Dozens of cables from US embassies around the world are seen inquiring into purchases by Pakistan's nuclear and missile complexes from the international market, the Dawn reports.
In a 2008 cable, the then US Deputy Chief of Mission to Turkey, Nancy McEldowney, detailed her discussions with Turkish authorities about the US' desire to see relevant action taken against a suspicious shipment to Pakistan.
According to the cable, US officials "urged the GOT (Government of Turkey) to contact the governments of Japan and Panama to request the shipment be diverted to another port and returned to the shipper".
While Turkish authorities "stressed that more lead time was necessary to allow the GOT to take action in such cases", McEldowney "underscored that, given the proliferation concerns related to this shipment and the fact that Pakistan's nuclear program is not under full-scope IAEA safeguards, the GOT should take all necessary action to prevent the shipment from arriving in Pakistan."
The intricate pursuit of suspect Pakistani shipments often involved discussions with Chinese authorities, the paper said.
For example, a secret December 2009 cable noted that when local authorities were notified of "Beijing-based Nav Technology's efforts to supply controlled gyroscopes to a firm in Pakistan", US officials received a satisfactory response "that as with all proliferation cases, China would 'actively cooperate' on this case".
In Taiwan, too, Pakistan's missile programme and related international trade came in for intense American scrutiny.
In a secret cable sent out from Taipei in the autumn of 2005, the then director of the American Institute of Taiwan, Douglas H Paal, sent a detailed report on Pakistan's trade with a local manufacturer, Xtra Industrial Corporation.
Paal wrote about how "Pakistani manufacturer 'Mechanical Engineering Workshop (MEW)' possibly purchased 14 sets of 'hydraulic cylinders' from Xtra Industrial Corporation in March 2005, from Taiwan-based Design Engineering Centre (DEC) transferred to Pakistan's National Development Complex (NDC) for research and development of short-mid range missiles."
As with other cases, Taiwanese authorities were recommended that they place Xtra under an inspection target list, even though the manufacturer did not violate Taiwan's strategic high tech commodity export control regulations.
On one occasion, French authorities rebuffed US requests to intercept a "shipment of telemetry equipment from the French firm In' Trad to Pakistan, with the possible end-user being New Technologies Islamabad, which is associated with Pakistan's ballistic missile programme."
In a secret cable from January 2005, a French non-proliferation official, David Bertolotti, was quoted as providing US officials with "comprehensive comments on the shipment and the reasons behind the Government of France's decision not to examine its contents and to allow it to continue onto Pakistan".
While the French officials emphasised that the "GOF wanted to be more helpful regarding the suspect corporation between In'Trad and Pakistani missile entities", they also pointed out that they needed "more precise information regarding the type of equipment being exported as well as clearer indications that the end users were associated with Pakistan's ballistic missile programme". ANI
